An Informed Model of Personal Information Release in Social Networking
  Sites by Squicciarini, Anna & Griffin, Christopher
An Informed Model of Personal Information
Release in Social Networking Sites
Anna Squicciarini
College of Information Science and Technology
Penn State University
University Park, PA 16802
E-mail: asquicciarini@psu.edu
Christopher Griffin
Applied Research Laboratory
Penn State University
University Park, PA 16802
E-mail: griffinch@ieee.org
Abstract—The emergence of online social networks and the
growing popularity of digital communication has resulted in an
increasingly amount of information about individuals available
on the Internet. Social network users are given the freedom to
create complex digital identities, and enrich them with truthful
or even fake personal information. However, this freedom has led
to serious security and privacy incidents, due to the role users’
identities play in establishing social and privacy settings.
In this paper, we take a step toward a better understanding
of online information exposure. Based on the detailed analysis
of a sample of real-world data, we develop a deception model
for online users. The model uses a game theoretic approach
to characterizing a user’s willingness to release, withhold or
lie about information depending on the behavior of individuals
within the user’s circle of friends. In the model, we take
into account both the heterogeneous nature of users and their
different attitudes, as well as the different types of information
they may expose online.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Myspace,
and Google+ allow individuals to present themselves and
establish or maintain connections with others. Users articulate
their social networks by creating and managing content, social
connections, and a possibly large amount of personal informa-
tion. A typical OSN in fact allows users to create connections
to friends, thereby sharing with them a wide variety of personal
information. These connections are often based on the alleged
identities and properties of the individuals populating the OSN.
Users of social media sites can, however, generate accounts
containing unverified information. On the one hand, this allows
the users to avoid identification and surveillance or observation
of any kind. On the other one, the ability to generate unverified
accounts on most of these sites, renders social relationships
potentially weak, if based on fake identities. Further, unverified
accounts may and are often used by malicious users to carry
out disruptive activities hidden behind fake identities [10].
To date, while some work has studied the incentives behind
information disclosures in OSNs [9], [18], [26], little is known
about identities misrepresentations.
In this paper, we speculate that information revelation
in OSN is a complex process where multiple contrasting
influences are in play: not only privacy attitudes, but also
social pressure and personal attitudes are at stake. Focusing
on three types of users’ behavior related to information reve-
lation: truthful information sharing, information withholding
and deception, we study the effect of misrepresentation in
these environments by means of a game theoretical model.
To ground our model, we conducted an extensive empirical
study, collecting data about users’ common behavior and their
attitude toward personal information disclosure. The study
involved almost 300 subjects, all active social network users.
Our study reveals important insights on users’ attitudes and
practices. In particular, our results show that users’ decisions
to lie or withhold information are not strongly influenced
by privacy concerns. Rather, results show strong correlations
between peer-pressure and attitudes toward lying. Users who
feel peer-pressured are less likely to withhold their informa-
tion, especially their whereabouts. The quest for gaining or
maintaining popularity also seems to play an important role,
in particular with respect to the amount of information users
choose to reveal. Also, we identified that users’ identity infor-
mation is managed differently depending upon the perceived
sensitivity of the information. For example, for basic demo-
graphic information, users tend not to lie in the main social
network account, as this is typically revealed in the course
of social interactions and may be easy to verify by social
network peers. On the other hand, information that is closer
to the users’ personal sphere, for example, social relationships,
whereabouts, etc. is revealed mostly by users who are in
search or popularity and/or are searching for self-affirmation
in the network. In addition, we find that misrepresentation
interacts with measures of morality, suggesting that users do
not associate lies in social networks with unethical behavior,
and that, where lying is considered unethical, they are more
likely to withhold information, as a form of boundary control.
Finally, we found that users’ behavior is mostly influenced by
inner circles of close online friends, regardless of the actual
number of social connections users have.
The analysis of the responses is used as input to inform our
qualitative model of user information sharing, withholding and
deception. In particular, building on the finding that users treat
information differently, the model presupposes that individuals
release, withhold or lie about certain classes of information
differently, and that each user behaves according to an in-
dividual payoff function. The payoff function is constructed
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to take into account the identified influential decision factors:
morality, peer pressure, privacy and popularity. The output of
the function is also affected by the behavior of a circle of close
friends - as we found strong evidence of self-validation and
peer influence in our study. We provide an example model
using evolutionary dynamics, which we posit influences a
users’ behavior as he interacts with his OSN overtime and
more accurately understands the true nature of his (personal)
objective function.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section reviews
relevant literature. Section III discusses our empirical study.
Section IV presents our model. We illustrate the various types
of users and information in our examples in Section V. We
conclude the paper in Section VI with pointers to future
research directions.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Digital identity constitutes one of the building blocks of
Web 2.0 technologies, ranging from social networking to e-
commerce. Problems related to digital identity management
and protection have been tackled by both the computer
science community and by information scientists. From the
computational standpoint, a variety of digital identity and
trust management mechanisms have been developed to allow
users to create and maintain complex digital personas [3], [9]
although there has been little work on the topic of digital
identity validation and trust in the context of social computing.
From a social science perspective, various studies have
explored identity sharing behavior in social network sites
and the risk of over exposure (notable examples are [2], [9],
[18], [26]). Research studies have shown that users in online
environments rely on a variety of cues to make determinations
about one another; however, all these cues are not deemed
equally credible. For instance, Goffman [12] notes that identity
cues can be intentionally given or unintentionally revealed, and
that humans are more likely to place greater weight on those
cues that are perceived to be unintentional as opposed to strate-
gically constructed. This ability to engage in deceptive self-
presentation online is compounded when users do not share a
social network and therefore have less access to information
triangles such as mutual friends who might confirm or deny
information. Donath [10] argues that a shared social network
can provide explicit or implicit verification of identity claims.
Therefore, as highlighted in [18], a highly connected network
such as Facebook should encourage more truthful profiles, or
misrepresentations that are playful or ironic as opposed to
being intentionally deceitful.
Burke et al. [7] studied user motivations for contributing
in social networking sites, based on server log data from
Facebook. They found that newcomers who see their friends
contributing go on to share more content themselves. Further-
more, those who were initially inclined to contribute, receiving
feedback and having a wide audience, were also predictors of
increased sharing.
Complementary to the body of work on identification and
information revelation, is the work on anonymity in social
network sites [5], [19], [27]. The emphasis in these works
is however on algorithmic approaches for non-disclosure and
anonymity preservation, rather than on actual revelation. Fi-
nally, parallel to this body of work is the work on repu-
tation [14], [29]. Reputation of digital identities and trust
in online environments have been investigated by multiple
research communities ranging from computer science [22] to
economics [6], [24].
With respect to our methodology, our work employs ana-
lytical models. Analytical models for various security topics
based on game, information and decision theories are rapidly
growing in interest [15]. In particular, game theoretic ap-
proaches to reputation and trust first emerged in the economics
literature (a typical example is [11]) and were then applied to
online settings [1], [17], [21]. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the only work analyzing social identities using
analytical tools is from Alpcan and colleagues [4]. Alpcan’s
work focuses on reputation and trust, where strategies are
defined in terms of opinion, quantified through a simple cost
function. As we discuss in the next sections, our focus is
on validation and individual attitudes toward deception, rather
than lies. Additionally, an interesting economically inspired
work dealing with users’ privacy is discussed by Papadim-
itrous and colleagues [17], who propose a precise estimate
of the value of the private information disclosed by a set of
individuals, and a compensation for such information release
that may induce users to release richer information. Yet, the
model applies to a different set of applications, such as online
surveys and e-commerce applications.
This work is part of our research effort on deception and
information revelation in social networking sites. In [25] we
studied the interaction of users and servers at the time of
user registration, and used a game theoretical framework to
describe a simple two-player general sum game describing
the behavior of a server system (like Facebook) that pro-
vides utility to user. We showed that in the presence of a
binding agreement to cooperate, most players will agree to
share information. In [13], we investigated a simpler game
model in which rewards for releasing information and costs
for withholding information and lying were represented by
arbitrarily chosen concave and convex functions. We showed
for a specific instance of a payoff function that a symmetric
Nash equilibria existed and was related to the automorphism
class of the graph describing the interaction graph of the social
network. This work substantially extends our previous work by
more accurately modeling the qualitative nature of the user’s
objective function through the incorporation of information in
our survey. Our previous work was purely theoretical, and used
a overly simplified the notion of identity. Identity was mainly
considered as an atomic value, and therefore was focused on
different aspects of information sharing in social networking
sites (for example the registration of new users). We also
incorporate a model of evolutionary dynamics to explain a
user’s choices as he interacts with his social network and is
exposed to his friend’s choices.
III. INFORMING THE MODEL THROUGH AN EXPLORATORY
STUDY
In order to understand typical social network users’ atti-
tudes and actions with respect to information disclosure, we
conducted an exploratory study using real-world data. The
specific aim of our study was to gain a deeper understanding
of users identity-revealing actions, the peculiar features of
average users, and the perceived understanding of identity on
social sites.
A. Methods
We conducted a web-based survey, collecting a total of
296 responses. Respondents were recruited from two different
undergraduate courses in the college of Information Science
and Technology at the Pennsylvania State University. One
extra credit point for the course was awarded for their par-
ticipation in the study. The survey was constructed to study
three specific aspects of users’ behavior: (1) privacy awareness,
(2) attitude toward information withholding and practices (3)
attitude toward lies and misrepresentation.
The respondents were aged between 20 and 35 (µ=23,
sd=2.34). The respondents were 65% male and 35% female.
99.3% of them declared to have at least one account on social
sites, and 12% declared to have more than one account on
the same OSN. Participants were asked to indicate the social
network they most often accessed: 95.3% most often accessed
Facebook, while the remaining participants were distributed
among Google+, Linkedin (6%) and Twitter. In terms of
network usage frequency, 94% of the respondents accessed
social network sites at least once a week, and 83.6% of those
were daily users.
Considering that Facebook is one of the social networks
that most heavily promotes personal information disclosure,
our sample was deemed appropriate for this study. While the
overall sample reflects a specific subset of the population, we
notice that most of the active users in Facebook, according to
recent statistics, are below 26 years old (and specifically in
the 21-24 age range) 1.
The instrument also included five broad types of measures
of perceived privacy, social pressure, and popularity (or social
capital), which serve as dependent variables.
B. Measures
• Deception was our independent measure, and was mea-
sured by two sets of 4 items each. The first set focused on
deceptive activities, and was measured on a a frequency
rating scale (1=all of the time to 5=never). The second
set of items related to the perception about deception
(lies and withholding information on social networking
sites). An example item is “Lying in social network is
unethical”. These items were also rate using a Likert
scale (5-point rating scale, where 1= strongly agree and
5=strongly disagree).
1http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics
ID Question Average Standard Dev.
Q1 I have put false
information in my
main social network
account (1=strongly
agree, 5=strongly
disagree)
1.87 0.4
Q2 I have withheld
information from my
main social network
account (1=strongly
agree, 5=strongly
disagree)
1.91 0.732
Q3 Putting false informa-
tion about myself and
my whereabouts on
my profile can help me
be more popular
2.45 0.453
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE VARIABLES CONCERNING DECEPTIVE ACTIVITIES
• Usage was measured using 6 different items. Three of the
items where focused on frequency of usage and number
of connections. The remaining items where added to
ascertain the extent to which the participant engages in
certain types of social interactions, e.g., posting images,
giving feedback to other’s posts or images, sharing a url,
tagging a video or an image. For these items, we used a
frequency rating scale (1=never to 5=once or a few times
a day)
• Privacy Concerns. Individual differences in privacy per-
ceptions can be significant [30], [32]. Thus, we need to
establish a baseline understanding about the awareness of
and attitudes toward privacy protection by participants. In
our survey, we included five questions to ask participants
about their information disclosure behaviors and privacy
concerns in Social Networking sites (Cronbach α = .71),
rated on a Likert scale (5-point rating scale, where 1=
strongly agree and 5=strongly disagree). An example item
is ”I have had concerns about the privacy of my data on
Social Networks”.
• Pressure was measured using 5 items (Cronbach α =
.823), focusing on pressure of updating information (e.g.
“I feel peer pressured to constantly update my Social
Network profile”) and uploading content. The items mea-
sured perceived pressure from the social networking and
from peers (e.g. “I need to update my profile often to be
popular among my friends”).
• Perceived Popularity was measured by 6 items (Cronbach
α = .732), focusing on the impact on one’s popularity
(or social capital) upon passively being involved in the
social interactions listed in the usage measures.
C. Findings
The main purpose of this study was to examine users
attitudes towards deception in social networking sites.
Leveraging results from previous research studies [10], [18],
we hypothesized that (h1) users in fact deceive in social
Fig. 1. Data Items most frequently misrepresented
networking sites, but mostly choose to portray truthful portions
of their basic identity, which could be validated offline (e.g. the
name or gender), and deceive or withhold information which
may be deemed too personal or inappropriate for disclosure
to the social network audience. We also hypothesized that
participants decision to withhold information or lie would
be influenced by (h2) their privacy inclination, (h3) their
perceived pressure to be active on the social network site and
(h4) their wish to be popular among peers. Finally, we were
interested in learning whether users’ decision to withhold or
lie would be connected with ethical choices. Here, we did not
have an initial hypothesis, but were interested in exploring the
correlations between morality and deception. We discuss our
results in a detailed manner in the following.
1) h1: Frequency of Deception: We began with identify-
ing whether deception is in fact significant. Table I presents the
descriptive statistics of some of the study’s variables related
to deception. As reported, a vast majority of the participants
admit to having lied at least once, and also chose to withhold
information (94% of respondents either agree or strongly
agreed to have lied -the exact statistics are reported in the
table). Figure 1 highlights the specific types of attributes users
most often lie about. We further determined that users who
are more likely to be involved in discussions and are therefore
active in the social networking site report a lower frequency
of lying (Pearson r=0.277, p=0.033), therefore reinforcing
the well-known signaling theory identified by Donath [10].
The relationship with the “withholding question” shows a
similar trend, but it is not statistically significant, therefore
a conclusive statement on this relationship is not possible.
Users also report it is easy to detect lies of their close social
connections with whom they often interact with (µ = 2.61,
sd. 0.912), again confirming that self-validation is effective in
social networking sites.
2) h1: Types of Information Revealed: To further explore
which pieces of information users are likely to withhold or
lie about, we asked users to indicate their preferred action
for six different personal pieces of information: location,
gender, GPA, relationship status, telephone number, current
occupation. We select properties that would be considered
important and potentially sensitive for our participants, who
Fig. 2. Responses breakdown by attribute
were mostly students. Users were given the option to indicate
for each attribute one of three choices: tell the truth, provide
false information, do not put anything.
The responses, organized by attribute, are reported in Figure
2. In our survey, most of the participants claimed to mis-
represent only specific pieces of information. In particular,
our analysis confirms that highly interconnected users are
likely to reveal basic identity properties, such as gender, age,
etc. truthfully (Pearson .436, r=0.012). Information commonly
deemed as private, such as telephone number and GPA, is
instead mostly withheld, or misrepresented. Finally, there is
some interesting variability with respect to location, current
occupation and relationship status, where there is not a pre-
dominant choice. These results confirm our hypothesis (h1).
3) Influential factors of information sharing: The anal-
ysis of the factors influencing information sharing activities
resulted in the following findings.
• h2: Privacy We first analyzed the responses related to pri-
vacy awareness, to get a sense of the respondents attitude
toward information revelation and leakage in social net-
working sites. An initial notable result is that, despite the
fact that most respondents maintained a detailed profile
on their favorite social network site, many of them also
demonstrated relatively high levels of privacy concern.
The responses to the statement “I maintain a detailed
profile on my main social network account” confirm that
they maintain rich profiles (µ=1.97, std=0.96), and that
they reveal their main identity for the most part (µ=2.01,
std=0.45). Nevertheless, their responses to the statement
“There is a high potential for loss involved in sharing
personal information on Social Networks like Facebook”
indicate their awareness of potential information leakage
(µ = 1.80, std=0.81). We then tested our first hypothesis,
i.e. whether lying or withholding information was related
at all to the respondents level of privacy awareness.
We conducted an exploratory least-squares multiple re-
gression analysis, regressing their responses to question
Q1, with their responses related to privacy concerns as
predictors. None of these appeared to be strongly related.
The results lead to interesting findings. First, in general
participants are concerned with their privacy on social
networking sites and are aware of the potential loss
of privacy; second, the results confirm the existence of
phenomenon known as the privacy paradox [31], in which
individuals state that they have privacy concerns, but
behave in ways that seemingly contradict these statements
by providing detailed information about themselves. Fi-
nally, our results show that privacy is not indicative of
their choice to deceive, or withhold information.
• h3: Pressure Next, we investigated whether participants
feeling peer pressured are more likely to deceive or
withhold information. We first tested whether feeling
peer pressured would be correlated with the amount of
personal information displayed on the social network site.
We conducted a simple regression analysis, using the
answer to the question “I feel peer pressured to constantly
update my profile” as an independent variable, and their
self-declared level of detailed social network profile as a
dependent variable. The test shows that the more users
agree to feeling pressured to update their profile, the more
they claim to display a detailed profile (Pearson r=0.433,
p=.034). We then studied whether the information being
revealed upon being pressured is truthful or not. We
correlated Q1 and Q2 with our items related to popularity.
Our results show that there is not a significant correlation
between users’ perceived peer-pressure and their choice
to deceive. However, there is a clear correlation between
their choice to withhold information and their feeling of
being peer pressured (Pearson r=0.163, p=0.03). That is
to say, the more users feel peer pressured, the less likely
they are to withhold information.
• h4: Popularity When correlated with measures relative
to popularity, we obtained the following results. First,
we correlated participants’ frequency of sharing content
(e.g., images) in the social networking site with their
perceived popularity gain by doing so. We obtained a
significant correlation (Pearsons r=0.272, p=.032). In line
with previous studies in this space [18], this finding shows
that the more users perceive certain social interactions to
benefit their social capital, the more likely they are to
pursue them. With respect to deception, the majority of
participants disagreed to have lied to gain popularity or
portray a different “self” (only 25% of respondents either
agreed or strongly agreed to the question ”I have put false
information to appear different from my original self”).
However, we discovered a significant correlation between
their quest for popularity and their deceptive activities
(Pearson r=-0.2449, r=0.015), therefore confirming our
hypothesis.
In summary, this study confirms that a social network user’s
tendency to deceive for certain data types is highly correlated
with his or her desire to portray a successful social image, and
not statistically related to privacy concerns. In other terms, the
perceived usefulness of the social network service increases
ID Question Avg St. Dev.
Q4 I consider lying in social
network sites unethical
3.30 0.943
Q5 I consider withholding in-
formation in social net-
work sites unethical
4.10 0.842
TABLE II
MORALITY AND DECEPTION (LIKERT SCALE: 1=STRONGLY
AGREE, 5=STRONGLY DISAGREE)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
−300
−200
−100
0
100
200
300
400
x
y(x
) a
nd
 z(
x)
 
 
y(x) = 0.756+0.344x
z(x) = 2.817−0.226x
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online users willingness to disclose their personal information.
4) Morality in Social Networking Sites: Our results show
non-obvious relation between lying or withholding information
on a social networking site and morality.
The results of correlating social network lying (correspond-
ing to Q1) with Q4 and Q5 are interesting, as they show
opposite effects of thinking that lying on a social network
is unethical and withholding information on a social network
is unethical. A higher value for Q4 (meaning an individual
disagrees that lying is unethical) predicts a higher frequency
of putting up false information on a social networking site
(Q1). However, a higher value for the withholding information
questions (Q5) predicts a lower frequency of putting up false
information. The linear equations obtained through regression
analysis are reported in Figure 3. This result seems to reinforce
the notion that lying on a social networking website and
withholding information function as two completely different
actions and that a user will choose one or the other based on
an internal utility function.
5) Inner Circles: Some other interesting findings were
related to the existence and importance users give to inner
circles within their social network. Despite the complex social
connections tying users together, users are most strongly influ-
enced by a small set of connections with whom they interact
regularly and whose opinion counts to them. By correlating
Q7 and Q8 (Table III), we discovered that regardless of the
number of social connections users have, most users check
and believe their profile is checked by a parallel number of
users (Pearson r= .521, p<0.001). Most of the actions (e.g.,
comments and feedback) users perform involve inner-circle
users, who are the ones influencing users decisions about lying
and not lying.
IV. GAME THEORETIC MODEL OF USER BEHAVIOR
We build on the game theoretic approach to modeling users’
actions in a social network begun in [13], [25] to qualitatively
explain the behavior observed in our experimental results.
We have identified that users treat types of information
differently with respect to whether they disclose, withhold or
deceive. Furthermore, we know that the behavior of users is
highly dependent on the behavior of a small group of their
immediate network neighbors.
Let G = (V,E) be a user graph for a social network
and suppose we have several classes of information I =
{1, . . . ,m}. Let x(j)i ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of information
type i that Player j will release and let y(j)i ∈ [0, 1] be
the proportion of information type i about which Player j
withholds. Then z(j)i ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of information
type i that Player j lies about. Then we have:
x
(j)
i + y
(j)
i + z
(j)
i = 1 (1)
Let:
x¯
(j)
i =
1
|N(j)|
∑
k∈N(j)
x
(k)
i (2)
where N(i) is the neighborhood of Player j in G. We make
similar definitions for y¯(j)i and z¯
(j)
i . These are the average
network level of releasing, withholding and lying about infor-
mation type i. In the presence of popularity measures (with
respect to a given user’s circle of friends) Equation 2 can be
modified to be a popularity weighted average with form:
xˆ
(j)
i =
1∑
k∈N(j) pk
∑
k∈N(j)
pkx
(k)
i
Here pk is the popularity weight for player k.
In [13], we assumed the existence of functions returning the
reward for releasing information and costs for group deception
and individual deception. We assumed these functions were
ID Question Scale Avg St. Dev.
Q7 How many friends
do you think typ-
ically check your
profile
1=“>150”,
2=[100,150],
3=[50,100], 4=<50
3.63 0.658
Q8 How many friends
do you check typi-
cally
1=“>150”,
2=[100,150],
3=[50,100], 4=<50
3.53 0.760
Q9 How many social
connections do you
have?
1=“>150”,
2=[100,150],
3=[50,100],
4=“<50”
1.48 .901
Q10 How often do you
visit your favorite
social network
site?
1=Once or a few
times a day 2=Once
or a few times a
week 3= Once or a
few times a month
4= Never
1.21 .464
TABLE III
SOCIAL NETWORK USAGE
concave, convex and convex (respectively), but provided no
way to isolate their structure. We propose a richer model than
the one in [13], which incorporates our observations from the
empirical evaluation:
1) The more users interact with the network, the less likely
they are to deceive (see Sect. III-C1))
2) Users perceive interactions with their social network as
a mechanism for gaining popularity, a form of social
capital (see Sect. III-C3).
For the remainder of this section, assume that we’ve fixed
an information type (e.g. location, interest, age etc). Again
leveraging our analysis (Section III-C3), we assume that five
elements make up each user’s objective function:
1) Social capital gained from sharing information within
the group,
2) Personal benefit gained from maintaining information
privacy,
3) Personal cost from the discovery of deceptive informa-
tion,
4) Moral cost from deceiving a group and
5) The cost associated with admitting information (in ex-
change for social capital).
The easiest way to understand the relationship of these ele-
ments is as a token based model in which each action, causes
a token (or fraction thereof) to be deposited into a specific
revenue or cost bucket. The proposed model for this system
is illustrated in the Petri net [8] shown in Figure 4. Given
space constraints, we cannot formally define Petri nets. In
short, they are graphical token models in which transitions
move and spread within the vertices of a graph structure. The
interested reader should see Chapter 1 of [8].
In general, we can think of the Truth, Withhold and
Truth Withold Lie
Admissions CostSocial Gain Privacy 
Gain
Lie 
Discovered
Lie not 
Discovered
Lie Social 
Cost
Moral Cost
Obtain new 
information to 
share
x(j) y(j) z(j)
↵(x¯, z¯)  (y¯)
 (z¯)
⌘
⇣
✓
⌘
↵(x¯, z¯) ⇣
⌧(·)1  ⌧(·)
Fig. 4. A Petri net model of the accumulation of various components of the
payoff associated to interacting in an online setting.
Lie transitions as being controlled by the user with all other
transitions being uncontrolled or controlled by nature. (Moody
[20] discusses control in Petri nets.) Alternatively, as shown
in Figure 4, we can think of the user controlling the fractional
weights on the transitions leading to the Truth, Withhold
and Lie transitions. If the Petri net is continuous, then we
can think of the weightings leaving the controlled transitions
as providing the benefit or cost for each token (or fraction
thereof). We let X(j), Y (j) and Z(j) be correlated random
variables whose dynamics are chosen by Player j. In general,
X(j) is 1 only if Player j releases a piece of information,
Y (j) is 1 only if Player j withholds information a piece of
information and Z(j) is 1 only if Player j deceives about a
piece of information. Naturally, only one of these elements
can be 1 at any given time t (thus we can think of these as
being the outputs of a single discrete distribution) chosen by
the player. At time t, Player j’s stochastic payoff function is:
Π(j)(t) = w1α(X
(j)(t), Z(j)(t), x¯(j), z¯(j), t, τ(t))+
w2
(
β(Y (j), y¯(j), t)Y (j)(t) + η(Z(j)(t))
)
−
w3γ(Z
(j), z¯(j), t, τ(t))− w4ζ(Z(j)(t))−
w5θ(X
(i)(t)) (3)
In this expression:
• α(X(j), Z(j), x¯(j), z¯(j), t) is a social capital function that
provides the reward obtained by releasing a piece of
information (true or false).
• β(Y (j), y¯(j), t) is privacy capital function that provides
the reward obtained by keeping a piece of information
private.
• γ(Z(j), z¯(j), t) is a cost function that yields the social
price of lying about a piece of information.
• θ is an admissions cost function for each piece of true
information revealed.
• ζ is a moral cost function associated with each lie told.
• η is a privacy gain function associated to each lie (since
a lie may protect privacy irrespective of any other moral
judgement.
• Finally τ(t) is the probability that a lie will be discovered
by the social group.
Over a period of time, the complete stochastic payoff
function for Player j is:
Π(j) =
T∑
t=0
ρtΠ(j)(t) (4)
The variables wi (i = 1, . . . , 5) are the relative weights Player
j places on each component of his objective function. We
can also think of τ as being a function of the total quantity
of information (true and false) that has been released to the
network:
Q(j)(s) =
s∑
t=0
X(j)(t) + Z(j)(t) (5)
This provides consistency with two observations reported in
Section III-C:
1) Users who engage in their social network more fre-
quently, tend to deceive less and
2) The more information available about a user, the easier
it is for him to be trapped in a lie.
The parameter ρ in Equation 4 is a discount factor chosen in
the set (0, 1]. It is worth noting that ρ is only important if we
wish to consider the limiting dynamics as T →∞. When ρ <
1, the user recognizes that future rewards have less value than
rewards more immediately. To relate the parameters x(j), y(j)
and z(j) to Equation 4, we need to compute the expected value
E
(
Π(j)
)
. In the form given, this may be complex, since the
functions defined in Equation 3 maybe non-linear, meaning we
cannot pass the expectation operator through the expression.
The solution to the game is then defined by the simultaneous
optimization problem:
∀j

max E
(
Π(j)(x(t),y(t), z(t))
)
s.t. x(j)(t) + y(j)(t) + z(j)(t) = 1 ∀t
x(j)(t), y(j)(t), z(j)(t) ≥ 0 ∀t
(6)
where x(t), y(t), z(t) are the vectors of decision variables for
the players. Let
Ω =
∏
j,t
{
(x(j)(t), y(j)(t), z(j)(t)) ∈ [0, 1]3 :
x(j)(t) + y(j)(t) + z(j)(t) = 1,
x(j)(t), y(j)(t), z(j)(t) ≥ 0
}
(7)
This is the complete strategy space for all players over the
course of time t ∈ [0, T ]. Any Nash equilibrium will be
chosen from this strategy space. Theorem 1 of [23] provides
the following (uninteresting) result:
Proposition IV.1. Suppose that E
(
Π(j)(x(t),y(t), z(t))
)
is
concave for all j then there is a Nash equilibrium in Ω for
this game.
Remark IV.2. The uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in this
case is completely a function of the structure of specific
objective functions.
We noted above that the structure of
E
(
Π(j)(x(t),y(t), z(t))
)
maybe complex. By way of
simplification, we can write a specific form of Equation 3, as:
Π(j)(t) =
w1α(x
(j), z(j), x¯(j), z¯(j), t)
(
X(j)(t) + (1− τ(t))Z(j)(t)
)
+ w2
(
β(y(j), y¯(j), t)Y (j)(t) + ηZ(j)(t)
)
− w3γ(z(j), z¯(j), t)τ(t)Z(j)(t)− w4ζZ(j)(t)
− w5θX(i)(t) (8)
Here we replace the functions from Equation 3 with piecewise
constant multipliers. We can then relate Equation 4 to the
parameters x(j), y(j) and z(j), we note that:
E
(
Π(j)
)
=
T∑
t=0
ρt·[
w1α(x
(j), z(j), x¯(j), z¯(j), t)
(
x(j)(t) + (1− τ(t))z(j)(t)
)
+ w2
(
β(y(j), y¯(j), t)y(j)(t) + ηz(j)(t)
)
−
w3γ(z
(j), z¯(j), t)τ(t)z(j)(t)−
w4ζz
(j)(t)− w5θx(i)(t)
]
(9)
That is, a user’s expected payoff after engaging in this game,
is a function of the proportion of time he releases information,
withholds information and lies about information. Moreover,
because we assume the reward/cost multipliers (α, β and
γ) are dependent on the group average rates of releasing,
withholding and lying about information, the payoff to Player
j is dependent on the choices of all other players in his circle
of friends. Thus, a game dynamic is established. We study this
simplified game form in the remainder of the paper.
V. EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS AND EXAMPLE
A critical problem with the game defined in the previos
section is that individuals will never optimize their behavior
according to it. An individual can estimate many of the
parameters in the model, but will never make decisions based
on the long run objective of maximizing his utility function.
It will simply be impossible for an individual to chose an
optimizing strategy ab initio, particularly without having a
clear understanding of the strategies of other players. This is
especially true if (as is likely the case) multiple Nash equilibria
exist.
However, a user may engage in a more evolutionary model
of decision making [28]2:
1) At any time t, Player j has a strategy
(x(j)(t), y(j)(t), z(j)(t)) with an initial strategy
(x(j)(0), y(j)(0), z(j)(0))
2) At each time t, Player j will solve the one-stage game
derived from Equation 9 by finding a maximizing strat-
egy
(
xˆ(j), yˆ(j), zˆ(j)
)
with respect to the current observed
strategies of the other players and the current parameters
in the model.
3) Each player’s strategy is updated by the rule:
x(j)(t+ 1) = x(j)(t) + (j)
(
xˆ(j) − x(j)(t)
)
(10)
y(j)(t+ 1) = y(j)(t) + (j)
(
yˆ(j) − y(j)(t)
)
(11)
x(j)(t+ 1) = z(j)(t) + (j)
(
zˆ(j) − z(j)(t)
)
(12)
Here (j) is a learning rate associated to the player, and is
assumed to be small – that is, (j)  1. The dynamics given
in Equations 10 - 12 are a discrete variation of the Jacobi
2Weibull’s book, [28] is an introduction to evolutionary game theory, which
inspires the approach described herein. We are not proposing a classical
evolutionary game. Instead, we are proposing an evolutionary mechanism
applied to a game theoretic context that describes user learning.
iteration for finding equilibria in games (see e.g., [16]). At its
core, this is just a form of gradient ascent.
Intuitively, each time a user makes a decision about a
piece of information, he considers his knowledge of the
other players and computes an optimal move for this time
period. However, instead of changing his strategy completely,
he modifies his strategy (learns) by a small amount in the
direction of optimality. This is consistent with an individual
who learns the average behavior of the social network.
A. Example
By way of example, assume we have a small clique of
three friends on a social network (this is the graph governing
Equation 2). Consider the following multiplier definitions
for use in Equation 9. These functions are derived from a
qualitative analysis of the data collected in the experiment
described in the previous sections, and are intended to be
simple token counting margin functions.
α(x(j), z(j), x¯(j), z¯(j)) =
{
1 x(j) + z(j) ≤ x¯(j) + z¯(j)
0 otherwise
(13)
In this case, the social value of information is non-zero only
if the information provided is in some way lower than the
mean information provided by the group. That is to say, you
can social capital only if you’re not posting more information
than the group average. However, if the group average is high,
you will accrue social capital the more you post.
β(y(j), y¯(j)) =
{
1 y(j) ≥ y¯(j)
0 otherwise
(14)
Here, the privacy value is non-zero only if the amount of
information that is to be admitted is larger than average amount
of information being admitted. Similarly, we can define:
γ(z(j), z¯(j)) =
{
1 z(j) ≥ z¯(j)
0 otherwise
(15)
In this case, the cost of a lie is only non-zero if the lie
is in some sense more egregious than the average level of
dishonesty. Finally, we can set: ζ = 1 and θ = 1.
Variations in the players behavior can then be created by
modifying w1, . . . , w5 in Equation 9. Finally, we assume that
τ increases linearly in time from 0.1 to 0.9. Recall, τ is the
probability that a lie can be detected by the social network.
Thus, as time proceeds, it becomes more likely that a falsehood
is detected because more information is available about each
player 3.
We study three specific examples of the dynamics produced
by this model to illustrate that even these (simple) dynamics
are capable of qualitatively reproducing behavior observed in
our study. In the first example, social capital is deemed more
important than privacy (w1 = 1, w2 = 0.25 and w5 = 0.125),
but there is a stronger sense of morality (w3 = 0.5, w4 = 1).
3In a fully formalized model, we believe that τ will be a function of Q
(defined in Equation 5), however for our simple studies, this is sufficient
We assume three identical players connected by a complete
graph with three vertices. Player evolution is illustrated in
Figure 5 When we start the game with three players, each
Fig. 5. Evolutionary output of a game with three identical players in which
w1 = 1, w2 = 0.25, w3 = 0.5, w4 = 1 and w5 = 0.125, suggesting that
social capital is much more important than the gain associated with privacy.
playing the strategy x(j) = 0.7, y(j) = 0.2 and z(j) = 0.1, we
see deception is removed from the system relatively quickly,
while information hiding increases (replacing deception in the
system). Notice the system converges to a stationary strategy
near x(j) = 2/3, y(j) = 1/3 and z(j) = 0. In simpler terms,
these equilibrium points are consistent with our findings that
social capital is much more important than the gain associated
with privacy, because we see that there is a preference toward
sharing information truthfully. This was observed in Section
III-C3. It is also worth noting, that it can be shown numerically
these are limiting Nash equilibria for this example.
By way of comparison, we can construct a game with less
morality and even more importance associated to social capital
(being obtained by any means necessary) with w1 = 2, w2 =
0.25, w3 = 0.25, w4 = 0.125 and w5 = 0.125. Note, w4 =
0.125 indicates a low moral penalty for lying. The evolution
of the players is illustrated in Figure 6.
The dynamics in this game are different, than those of the
first game. There is an initial, substantial, increase in the level
of deception (when it is easy to lie) in order to obtain social
capital. As it becomes more difficult to lie, the players return to
a more truthful scenario that is easier to support. This example
confirms the identified effects of the signaling theory in our
dataset: users are less likely to deceive when they are heavily
involved in social interactions (Section III-C1 and III-C2).
In our final example, we consider a highly moral player who
puts less emphasis on social capital and substantial emphasis
on information privacy. In this case, we have: w1 = 0.5,
w2 = 5, w3 = 2, w4 = 100 and w5 = 3. The results are
illustrated in Figure 7. This objective function models a user
who is highly moral deciding whether to release an informa-
tion type that may be sensitive, such as GPA or dating status
and illustrates the ability of the model to capture the various
qualitative results observed in the survey. In particular, this
Fig. 6. Evolutionary output of a game with three identical players in which
w1 = 2, w2 = 0.25, w3 = 0.25, w4 = 0.125 and w5 = 0.125, suggesting
that social capital is much more important than the gain associated with
privacy and morality is of little concern.
Fig. 7. Evolutionary output of a game with three identical players in which
w1 = 0.5, w2 = 5, w3 = 2, w4 = 100 and w5 = 3, suggesting that
morality and privacy are paramount to this user.
result is consistent with the finding reported in Section III-C4:
withholding is used as a form of control when deception is
considered unethical.
The proposed approach can also be used to study richer
scenarios, including those with players that begin with dif-
ferent strategies and games that are played on distinct graph
structures as was discussed in [13].
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this work, we have shown an informed model on decep-
tion and misrepresentation in OSNs. The model is derived
from a token counting approach modeled in a stochastic,
continuous Petri net. This net is then used to derive an
objective function for each player in which the payoff to a
given player is a function not only of his decisions but also
the decisions of his circle of friends. This leads to a game
theoretic framework. We show that while this game has at
least one Nash equilibria, it is more interesting to consider an
evolutionary game dynamic in which players learn over time
and converge to a stationary strategy.
We are left with a number of unsolved questions, that we
plan to explore in the near future. First, we are interested in
collecting more detailed data from real-world users, to deepen
our understanding of users’ interactions and identity revelation
processes. For example, in the current study we did not focus
on the users’ actions, that result in identity disclosure. What
are the typical passive social transactions (post an item on your
page which may be silently consumed by those who’ve been
given access to it) or active transactions (sharing, commenting
on other’s content or status updates, give feedback) that lead to
information revelation and/or to deception? How do different
outcomes of such transactions affect social capital, and there-
fore result in truthful and untruthful information sharing? How
do secondary (friend-of-friend, triad) relationships influence
information sharing? Results obtained from these studies will
guide the next step of our research on the model.
For example, using this information, we would like to
determine the structural characteristics of the benefit and cost
functions in Equation 4. In addition to this, it would be useful
to identify whether the dynamics described force the players
to converge to an equilibria of some type. We expect that
convergence to an equilibrium point should occur, but it is not
clear if this is a global property of all well-behaved payoff
functions. As noted in [13] there can be an interaction between
the properties of the graph on which the game is played and
the number and type of symmetric equilibria. We have not
explored this using the model presented in this paper, but we
believe this is a necessary step in understanding the behavior
of user dynamics in information expression in social networks.
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